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Abstract Website hacking is a frequent attack type
used by malicious actors to obtain confidential informa-
tion, modify the integrity of web pages or make websites
unavailable. The tools used by attackers are becoming
more and more automated and sophisticated, and mali-
cious machine learning agents seems to be the next de-
velopment in this line. In order to provide ethical hack-
ers with similar tools, and to understand the impact
and the limitations of artificial agents, we present in this
paper a model that formalizes web hacking tasks for re-
inforcement learning agents. Our model, named Agent
Web Model, considers web hacking as a capture-the-flag
style challenge, and it defines reinforcement learning
problems at seven different levels of abstraction. We
discuss the complexity of these problems in terms of
actions and states an agent has to deal with, and we
show that such a model allows to represent most of the
relevant web vulnerabilities. Aware that the driver of
advances in reinforcement learning is the availability of
standardized challenges, we provide an implementation
for the first three abstraction layers, in the hope that
the community would consider these challenges in order
to develop intelligent web hacking agents.
Keywords Agent Web Model · Penetration Testing ·
Capture the Flag · Reinforcement Learning
L. Erdo˝di
Department of Informatics,
University of Oslo,
0316 Oslo, Norway
E-mail: laszloe@ifi.uio.no
F.M. Zennaro
Department of Informatics,
University of Oslo,
0316 Oslo, Norway
E-mail: fabiomz@ifi.uio.no
1 Introduction
As the complexity of computer systems and networks
significantly increased during the last decades, the num-
ber of vulnerabilities inside a system similarly raised.
Different types of attackers may try to exploit these
varying vulnerabilities for their own benefits. Websites
are especially of interest to malicious actors, so attacks
against websites nowadays are an everyday event. In
order to protect vulnerable systems, one of the best
approaches is to emulate real attacks using the same
methodology that hackers would use. This practice, na-
med white hat hacking, has become a crucial part of
critical information technology projects. When taking
part into a white hat hacking project aimed at testing
the security of a target website, ethical hackers attack
the system and report all their findings to the system
owner or administrator so that the vulnerabilities can
be patched. Ethical hacking is normally a human job,
since the attacker needs a high level of expertise in pen-
etration testing, which involves typically human capa-
bilities (such as experience, reasoning, or intuition) that
are hard to codify.
Although full automation of penetration testing is
very challenging, hackers rely on a range of automatic
tools [10] [25] [2] to help them dealing with the number
and the variety of possible vulnerabilities. In the case
of web testing, there are many web security scanners
that can help the work of a human tester. These tools
can use predefined requests to check the existence of
a vulnerability, and quickly generate security reports;
however they have limited capability to carry out com-
plex evaluations, and their findings must normally be
reviewed by a human supervisor. Indexes of quality,
such as the number of false positives and false nega-
tives, highlight the limited coverage of these tools. New
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vulnerability detection scripts and general updates may
be deployed to improve the performance of web vulner-
ability scanners, but these are usually one-time solu-
tions; automatic improvements, relying, for instance,
on learning from previous cases, are lacking. Further-
more, many web scanners are designed only to detect
vulnerabilities, but not to exploit them. Specific tools
can be used to exploit [7], with a moderate chance of
success, targeted vulnerabilities, and thus further the
understanding of the overall security of the system un-
der study.
Machine learning (ML) techniques aimed at solving
problems through learning and inference are now being
adopted in many fields, including security [32]. Follow-
ing their success in challenging tasks like image recog-
nition [19] or natural language processing [34], super-
vised deep neural network models have been adopted
to tackle security-related problems in a static context,
such as program vulnerability detection [26] or mali-
cious domain name detection [20]. However deep neural
networks designed to solve static problems exploiting
large data sets of examples do not conform to the more
complex and dynamic problem of penetration testing. A
sub-field of ML that may offer a more relevant paradigm
to tackle problems such as web testing, is reinforce-
ment learning. Indeed, reinforcement learning methods
allow an agent to learn by itself in a dynamic and com-
plex environment by trial-and-error and inference. Suc-
cess on challenging games like Go [30] or Starcraft II
[35] suggests that these algorithm may find soon use in
the world of penetration testing. Recently, some appli-
cations of ML and reinforcement learning in the con-
text of offensive security were developed; on the side of
white hat hackers, DARPA organized in 2016 the Cy-
ber Grand Challenge for automated penetration testing
[11]; on the side of black hat hackers malicious bots are
being provided with more learning functionalities.
Given the impact that artificial agents will have in
the landscape of security, this paper aims at promoting
research in this direction by proposing a modelling of
penetration testing problems that may be used to train
reinforcement learning agents. Our modelling effort fol-
lows two directions: we first examine the formalization
of web hacking problems using standard models, and we
then discuss abstractions of concrete instances of web
hacking problems within our model. We call our generic
model the Agent Web Model. Aware that a strong and
effective driver for the development of new and success-
ful reinforcement learning agents is the availability of
standardized challenges and benchmark, we use our for-
malization to implement a series of challenges at differ-
ent level of abstractions and with increasing complexity.
We make these challenges available following the stan-
dards of the field. Our hope is that these challenges
will promote and advance research in the development
of automatic red bots that may help in the tasks of
penetration testing.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the main concepts related to web hacking and reinforce-
ment learning. Section 3 discusses how the generic prob-
lem of web hacking may be reduced, through a set of
formalization steps, to a reinforcement learning prob-
lem. Section 4 describes our own model for web hacking
problems and describes instances of problems at differ-
ent level of abstraction. Section 5 explains how real-
world hacking problems may be mapped onto the Web
Agent Model. Section 6 provides some details on the im-
plementation of challenges based on our formalization.
Finally, Section 7 discusses some ethical considerations
about this work, and Section 8 draws conclusions and
illustrates possible directions for future work.
2 Background
2.1 Web hacking
The most famous and popular Internet service, the World
Wide Web (WWW), has been running for many years
[3]. Since its invention in 1989 it had undergone many
developments, and nowadays it is one of the most com-
plex services on the Internet. The HTTP protocol [9]
used by these web services has been created for the
communication within a client-server model. The web
client, typically a web browser, sends a HTTP request
to a webserver; the webserver, in turn, answers with
a HTTP response. A HTTP messages consist of three
main parts: the Uniform Resource Locator (URL), the
HTTP header, and the HTTP body. The URL refer-
ences the requested object. The header contains infor-
mation on the state of the communication. The request
header sent by a client specifies the web method (i.e.,
what to do with the object), client-related information
(e.g., the type of the web browser), and cookie values
referring to previous states of the communication. The
answer header sent by a server contains the answer code
to the request (e.g., file not found) and information
related to the state of the communication (e.g., new
cookie values with session variables). The body part of
the HTTP message contains the payload of the commu-
nication. The request body may contain POST param-
eters sent by the client. The answer body usually con-
tains the longest part of the message, that is, the web
page content in Hypertext Markup Language (HTTP)
format.
Web communication is well defined by the HTTP
standard. In time, due to the high number of com-
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ponents participating in the web communication, the
web protocol has become increasingly complex, open-
ing room to different vulnerabilities [37]. On the client
side, a minimal web client can be easily realized by in-
stantiating a TCP connection and by sending HTTP
requests via command line. However, to enjoy the rich
functionalities provided by HTML, including the last
standard HTML5, web browsers are normally used. A
web browser is an application providing a graphical
interface that shows a HTML page with all its com-
ponents. A HTML page may also contain code in the
form of client-side scripts (such as javascript or scripts
in other embedded objects), which can be executed lo-
cally by a web browser. Any unintended or malicious
client-side script can have serious consequences dur-
ing the web communication. If an attacker can sniff
web traffic without encryption, or if the message can
be decrypted, then attackers can set up man-in-the-
middle exploitations. On the server side, the webserver
runs on a physical or virtual computer, which may ex-
pose non-HTTP-related vulnerabilities at the level of
the operating systems, at the level of the applications
running the webserver (e.g., Apache, Ngin-x, IIS) or by
exposing other vulnerable services on the web. With
respect to the HTTP protocol, one of the most signifi-
cant, and potentially vulnerable, parts of website access
is the server-side scripting engine. Server-side scripting
makes possible for the server to accept input sent by the
client in order to customize its web answer. Based on
the input, a server-side script can create connections to
other resources such as local files or database records.
Many components, such as Content Management Sys-
tems (CMS), provide ready modules for different func-
tionalities using some server-side scripts. Having a vul-
nerability in a CMS can expose millions of website that
run the same vulnerable module.
Using the web protocol can thus expose several weak
points that can be targeted by malicious actors. The
type of the attacks can vary, but they can be categorized
according to the information security triplet. Several
attacks aim to break the confidentiality by accessing
sensitive or confidential information; in such attacks,
the attacker may be able to find hidden objects such
as files or database data, or she may manage to esca-
late her privileges in order to access protected data. In
other cases, object integrity is targeted, either to cause
damage and annoyance or as a preparatory step before
carrying out further action; for instance, an attacker
may upload a command script to the website (chang-
ing the integrity of the site) and use it to further her
attack with more options. The third type of attack ad-
dresses the availability of the service; overloading a web
service with many request can cause a denial of service
(DOS).
2.2 Capture the Flag
A Capture The Flag challenge (CTF) is a competi-
tion designed to offer to ethical hackers a platform to
learn about penetration testing and train their skills
[21]. CTFs are organized as a set of well-formalized and
well-defined hacking challenges. Each challenge has one
exploitable vulnerability (or, sometimes, a chain of vul-
nerabilities) and an unambiguous victory condition in
the form of a flag, that is, a token that proves whether
the challenge was solved or not. Usually, a CTF requires
purely logical and technical skills, and they exclude re-
liance on side channels such as social engineering; more-
over, challenges are normally designed to make the use
of brute-forcing or automatic tools unfeasible.
The standard setup of a CTF is the so-called Jeop-
ardy mode, in which all players target a single static sys-
tem. More realistic setups may include the deployment
of non-static services with evolving vulnerabilities, or
the partition of players in teams, usually a red team,
tasked with retrieving flags from the target system, and
blue team, responsible for preventing the attacker from
obtaining the flags.
In the case of web challenges, a standard CTF con-
sists of a website hosting objects with different vul-
nerabilities, and containing flags in the form of special
strings. Participants are required simply to collect the
flag, and no further exploitative actions are required
(such as, setting up a command and control system).
Jeopardy-style web CTFs constitute collections of rig-
orous challenges: the environment in which to operate
is well-defined, actions can take place only in the dig-
ital domain, and objectives and victory conditions are
clearly stated. All these properties make CTFs inter-
esting case-studies to develop artificial agents for pen-
etration testing.
2.3 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a sub-field of machine
learning focused on the training of agents in a given
environment [33]. Within such an environment, agents
are given the possibility to choose actions from a finite
set of available actions; upon undertaking an action,
they can observe the consequences of their actions, both
in terms of the effect on the environment, and in terms
of a reward signal that specify how good or desirable is
the outcome of that action. The aim of RL is to define
algorithms that would allow an agent to develop an
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action policy leading to as high a reward as possible in
time.
The RL problem may be particularly challenging,
as the space of actions for the agent may be large,
the environment may be stochastic and non-stationary,
and the reward signal may be sparse. However, despite
these difficulties, RL has been proved successful in tack-
ling a wide range of problems, such as mastering games
[22, 30] or driving autonomous vehicles [28]. The abil-
ity to learn in complex learning environment, such as
Starcraft II [35], mirrors the sort of learning that a web
hacking agent is expected to perform. RL algorithms
may then offer a way to train artificial agent able to
carry out meaningful penetration testing.
2.4 Related Work
Interest in training artificial red bots able to compete
in a CTF challenge has been heightened after DARPA
organized a Cyber Grand Challenge Event in 2016 in
Las Vegas [11]. In this simplified CTF-like contest, ar-
tificial agents were given the possibility to interact with
a system exposing a limited number of commands.
However, interest in the problem of modelling and
solving hacking or penetration problems predates this
event. Different formalizations of CTF-like problems or
penetration testing have been suggested in the litera-
ture. Standard models relied on formalism from graph
theory (e.g., Markov decision processes [27]), planning
(e.g., classical planning [5]), or game theory (e.g., Stack-
elberg games [31]); a wide spectrum of models with
varying degrees of uncertainty and varying degree of
structure in the action space is presented in [14].
Model-free approaches in which the agent is pro-
vided with minimal information about the structure of
the problem have been recently considered through the
adoption of RL [12, 8, 23, 24]. While these works focus
on the application of RL to solve specific challenges, in
this paper we analyze the problem of how to define in
a versatile and consistent way relevant CTF problems
for RL. Notice that, in parallel to this work, some of
the problems presented in this paper have already been
analyzed and solved with simple RL algorithms in [38].
This paper, however, reconsiders particular instances of
problem tackled in [38] in a wider and more formalized
perspective, presenting them within a layered frame-
work of levels of abstraction.
3 Formalization of Web Hacking
In this section, we explore how the ill-defined problem
of web hacking may be formalized using different types
of standard models (Web hacking → CTF → game →
RL problem).
3.1 From web hacking to CTF
As discussed in Chapter 2, real-world web hacking is an
extremely complex problem, with vague success condi-
tions and presenting a wide array of possible courses of
action, ranging from the exploitation of publicly known
vulnerabilities to reliance on non-technical side-channels
like social engineering.
CTF challenges represent a way to specify web hack-
ing problems. CTFs offer a clear, and yet realistic, way
to define web hacking challenges. There are two im-
portant advantages in the modelling of web hacking
as CTF: (i) CTF challenges have a well-defined objec-
tive, and unambiguous termination conditions (either
in terms of flag retrieval or time expiration); and, (ii)
CTF challenges define an initial restriction on the ac-
tions that can be undertaken by a participant (normally
requiring all attempts and attacks to take place in the
digital domain).
In this sense we can understand CTFs as a first
step in the formalization of web hacking. However, this
formalization is still too loose to be useful for machine
learning; most importantly, the space of actions, while
being implicitly defined, is still too unconstrained to be
useful.
3.2 From CTF to game
To further our modelling, we can express CTFs in game-
theoretic terms. Web hacking CTFs can be defined as
a game:
G = 〈P,A,u〉 ,
where,
– P is a set of players,
– A is a set of actions available to players,
– u is a vector of utility or payoff functions, such that
ui is the utility function for player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |P|.
The simplest instance of CTF is a 2-player game
with |P| = 2, where one player is the attacker and
the second player is the webserver. As long as the web
CTF challenge is static, the webserver may be conceived
as a player deterministically reacting to the actions of
the attacker. As explained in Section 2.2, this basic
CTF setup may be extended to adversarial multiplayer
games with |P| = N , where players are partitioned in a
red team and a blue team. In the following, we will focus
our attention and our discussion on the 2-player game,
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although our considerations apply straightforward to
the multiplayer case.
For any player, we assume the set of action A to be
finite or countable, so as to allow an artificial agent to
select its actions. Notice that this assumption of finite-
ness or countability is reasonable as long as a CTF takes
place in a digital and discrete domain.
The utility function ui of a player allows for the
encoding of the victory condition expressed by a CTF
challenge. A stark binary utility function allows to as-
sign a positive utility to the capture of the flag, and a
null utility to everything else. More refined utility func-
tions may allow to shape the behaviour of a learned
agent more subtly.
A game-theoretic formalization can then be seen as
a further step in the process of formalization of web
hacking problems. The main contribution in this form
modelling, contrasted with a generic CTF model, is the
definition of an enumerable set A of possible actions.
This provides the foundation for an agent to choose
actions and learn its own action policy. Although game
theory already provides tools to analyze web hacking
as we have modeled it, this formalization is still not
ideal as the modeling of a webserver as an active player
results over-generic. In the case of interest, in which
we have a single attacker targeting a static system, it
would be more practical to describe the webserver as a
static component of the game.
3.3 From game to RL problem
In the case of web hacking with a static system, the
game-theoretic modelling over-defines the webserver by
describing it as a player. Alternatively, we can model
the game as a RL problem:
R = 〈S,A, T ,R〉 ,
where
– S is a set of states the game may be in,
– A is a set of actions,
– T : S × A → S is a state transition function defin-
ing how states evolve given an initial state and an
action,
– R : S × A → R is a reward function defining the
reward obtained by an agent after taking an action
in a given state.
A RL problem thus defined implicitly assumes a sin-
gle player. In this model, the webserver is not repre-
sented as a second player, but its internal logic is im-
plemented in the state transition function T . The state
transition function specifies how the system reacts upon
the action of the playing agent, and its dynamics relies
on two assumptions. First, we assumed that, in gen-
eral, the result of an action a ∈ A depends not only on
the action itself, but also on the current state s ∈ S
of the system. This correspond to the assumption of a
stateful system. This assumption is meaningful, as real
web systems may be in different states after interact-
ing with their users. Notice that a stateless system can,
in any way, be considered as a limit case of a stateful
system with a single unchanging state. Second, we as-
sumed that, in general, the result of an action a ∈ A,
given the current state s ∈ S, may be stochastic. This
assumption is meaningful in that real web systems may
rely on stochastic functions. Moreover, such an assump-
tion may allow us to model potential network commu-
nication fails or attempts by the system to obfuscate
its logic. Notice that a deterministic state can, in any
way, be considered as a limit case of a stochastic system
with a delta distribution function. In sum, we express
the logic of the webserver as a probabilistic transition
function T = P (s′|s, a) specifying a probability dis-
tribution over future states s′, given the current state
s and action a. We will refer to T as the transition
function, the logic of the game, or the dynamics of the
environment.
As in the game-theoretic formulation, the set of ac-
tion A is a countable set of actions available to the
agent.
The reward function R translates the utility funci-
ton u from the game-theoretic modelling to the RL for-
malism.
Finally, the set of states S allows for the tracking of
the state of the game. Notice that, although the state of
the game is uniquely determined at any point in time,
the agent may not be aware of it. This leads to a par-
tially observable game, in which the agent has no certain
knowledge about the current state of the system, but
it has only belief over the possible states. Through its
own local state, which encodes its imperfect knowledge,
the agent tries to keep track of the actual state of the
system. Notice that a completely observable game may
be considered as a limit case in which all the beliefs
collapse into delta functions.
This final RL formalization captures well enough the
problem of web hacking: it is flexible enough to accom-
modate very different hacking challenges, but, at the
same time, is constrained enough that all its component
are well-defined so that standard RL algorithms may be
used to train artificial agents. We will then make the
RL formalization the theoretical blueprint of our model
for web hacking.
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4 The Agent Web Model
In this section we use the RL formalism defined in Sec-
tion 3 to characterize our own model for web hacking.
We then discuss how this generic model may be used
to implement actual web hacking problems at different
levels of abstraction.
4.1 The Agent Web Model
In order to define a RL problem, it is necessary to de-
fine the state transition function of the problem. In our
context, this function represents the logic of the tar-
get webserver. Different systems, with different types of
vulnerabilities, may be represented in different ways. To
simplify the modelling of a webserver, we will represent
it as a collection of generic objects. These objects are
taken to represent entities of interest (e.g.: files, ports)
that can be targeted by the actions A of an attacker.
This simplification allows us to decompose the design
of a target system, its logic and its states. Transition
functions can be defined in a modular way with respect
to specific objects, and the state of the system may be
factored in the state of single objects.
The decomposition of a webserver into a collection
of objects also allows us to easily define instances of
webservers at different levels of abstraction. By defining
the nature and the number of existing objects, and by
defining which actions an agent can take in relation
to the defined objects, we can immediately control the
complexity of the RL problem at hand.
Moreover, another aim of ours in having a modu-
lar system defined in terms of individual objects, is the
possibility of instantiating new challenges in an auto-
matic, possibly random, way. Such a generative model
of web-hacking problems would provide the opportu-
nity to easily generate a large number of problems on
which to train a RL agent.
We call this flexible, generative model to instantiate
different types of web hacking problems, the Agent Web
Model.
4.2 Levels of abstraction
Concretely, we define 7 different levels of abstraction
for web hacking with increasing complexity in terms of
the actions and the feedback that the agent can receive
(see Figure 1). We start at level1 with the model of a
very simple website, composed of basic files, without
web parameters and sessions. At higher levels, we allow
the agent to interact with more complex objects mak-
ing up the website: requests to files can accept multiple
Fig. 1: Levels of abstraction in the Agent Web Model.
input parameters with different web methods, as well
as multiple session values. A hacking problem at level1
has a trivial solution which could be coded manually
in a simple algorithm, but we will show that the com-
putational complexity soon escalates as we move up in
the levels. A hacking problem at level7 is close to real-
world web hacking, where an attacker can even create
its own objects on the target site (e.g. command script)
and carry out complex exploitation strategies; this sort
of problem is far from a trivial solution.
In the following, we discuss the details of the dif-
ferent layers of the Agent Web Model, including the
number of states and actions that have to be handled
in different levels. Except when explicitly stated, in all
levels of abstractions we will assume that the objects on
a webserver are files, and we will take a simple binary
reward function R that returns a unitary reward when
the agent accomplishes its task, and zero otherwise.
4.2.1 Level1 - Link layer
In level1, a website is composed by a setO = {file1,file2,
...,fileN} of objects representing simple static HTML
files. We take the first file to represent the index.html
file inside the webroot. Files are linked to each oth-
ers by pointers, and one of the files contains the flag.
All the files can be accessed by the agent without re-
strictions; no parameters are required, and the HTTP
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Fig. 2: Example of webserver at level1.
Nodes represent files and solid arrows represent connec-
tions between files.
headers have no meaningful information such as ses-
sions. The actual file content is irrelevant, except for
the case of the flag. Practically, level1 problems can be
represented as a directed graph of files (see Figure 2).
The set of actions comprises only two parametric
actions: A = {read(filei), search(filei)}. The action
read(filei) reads the i
th file and returns the list of linked
files. The action search(filei) checks the i
th file for the
presence of the flag. See Table 1 for a summary of the
actions, their parameters and their return values. Note
that these actions can be performed only on files that
the agent has discovered on the remote webserver.
Table 1: Actions in level1
Action name Parameters Result
read() file set of files
search() file true/false
Without training a RL agent, a simple heuristic so-
lution to this problem would be to read the files one by
one in order to discover all files, and then search for the
flag inside each one.
The number of files N that a website hosts has a
significant influence on the problem scale. The actual
size of the action space |A| depends on the value of
N : an agent can take up to 2N different actions, that
is, a read() action and a search() action for each file.
Moreover, an agent is required to keep track of its own
knowledge state, that is record what actions has been
executed and what result was observed. A basic agent
can simply track, for each file, whether action read()
was tried (2N states) and whether action search() was
tried (2N states). In total, it will have 22N−1 states;
Table 2 shows an estimate of the number of actions
and states as a function of the number of files.
Table 2: Number of actions and states in level1
Number of files Number of actions Number of states
N 2N 22N−1
2 4 8
3 6 32
5 10 512
10 20 ≈ 5 · 105
Fig. 3: Example of webserver at level2
Nodes represent files, solid arrows represent direct con-
nections, dashed arrows represent indirect connections
between files.
4.2.2 Level2 - Hidden link layer
In level2, we model again the website as a collection
of static HTML files. Files are still linked by pointers,
but we now distinguish two types of pointers: links that
are openly visible to the attacker upon reading the files
(as it was in level1), and implicit pointers that requires
an actual analysis of the file. Real-world examples of
these types of implicit pointers may be: comments in
the source code that refers to another file without stat-
ing a direct link; keywords used in the file that refer to
a special type or version of a webserver app or CMS,
and that indicate the existence of other default files;
recurrent appearance of a word, suggesting that there
may be a file or folder with the same name. Practically,
level2 problems can be represented as directed typed
graph of files with two types of edges (see Figure 3).
The set of actions of the agent is composed now
of three parametric actions A = {read (filei), search
(filei), deepread (filei)}. As before, action read(filei)
read the ith file and returns a list of files connected by
an explicit link, while search(filei) checks the i
th file
for the presence of the flag. The action deepread(filei
processes the ith file and returns a list of files connected
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by implicit links. See Table 3 for a summary of the ac-
tions, their parameters, and their return values. Notice
that, at this level of abstraction, the logic and the al-
gorithm for performing a deepread() is implicitly pro-
vided in the game itself. At higher levels of abstraction,
the task of actually parsing a HTML file and uncover
the possible URLs of new files would be delegated to the
learning agent; such an agent would receive the actual
content of a file and it could use a range of algorithms
to process the text, from simple dictionary mapping
(e.g.: apache mapping to cgi-bin, wordpress mapping to
wp-login, etc.) to more complex natural language pro-
cessing neural networks able to propose new potential
file candidates.
Table 3: Actions in level2
Action name Parameters Result
read() file set of files
deepread() file set of files
search() filename true/false
Given N files on the webserver, the cardinality of
the action space is now |A| = 3N and the cardinality of
agent state space is 23N−1, by trivially scaling up from
level1 because of an additional action. Table 4 shows
estimates for few values of N .
Table 4: Number of actions and states in level2
Number of files Number of actions Number of states
n 3N 23N−1
2 6 32
3 9 256
5 15 16384
10 30 ≈ 5.3 · 108
4.2.3 Level3 - Dynamic content layer
The real complexity of a website starts with server-side
scripting. In level3 we consider a webserver that can
dynamically execute server-side scripts by processing
user parameters and generating static content for the
client. A single web file can provide multiple results
based on the parameters that the site receives from the
client. We still model the webserver as a collection of
static files, delegating the complexity of dynamic server-
side scripting in the space of actions. From a practical
perspective, the webserver can still be seen as directed
Fig. 4: Example of webserver at level3
Solid nodes represent files, dotted nodes within a file
illustrate a pair of parameter name and value that may
be sent to a file, solid arrows and dashed arrows rep-
resent respectively direct and indirect connections be-
tween files given a parameter pair.
If an arrow leads to a file, it means that upon a success-
ful read() or deepread() action the file itself is revealed
without parameters; if an arrow leads to an internal dot-
ted node, then after a successful read() or deepread(),
a file together with a parameter list for the file is also
sent back to the agent.
typed graph with nodes that may return different values
depending on the received parameter (see Figure 4).
In order to account for parameter passing, we now
define a new set of parametric actions: A = {read(filei,
pnamej , pvalk), search(filei, pnamej , pvalk), deepread
(filei, pnamej , pvalk)}. Actions have the same seman-
tics as in level2, but now, beyond receiving file i as an
input parameter, they also receive parameter name j
and parameter value k. This reflects the request of a
specific URL (file i) together with a specific parameter
(parameter name j) and a set value (parameter value
k). The return value of the read() and deepread() ac-
tions is also enriched by a possible set of parameter
names and values; this is due to the fact that the an-
swer of the webserver may contain not only links to
other files, but it may include the specific parameter
pairs relevant to the connected files. See Table 5 for a
summary of the actions, their parameters, and their re-
turn values. Notice that at this level of abstraction, we
assume that only a single pair (pnamej ,pvalk) can be
specified as input; moreover, to keep the complexity in
check, we assume that pnamej and pvalk may assume
values in a finite set, that is 1 ≤ j ≤M and 1 ≤ k ≤ O,
M,O ∈ N≥0.
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Table 5: Actions in level3
Action name Parameters Result
read() file, set of files,
parameter name, set of parameter
parameter value names and values
deepread() file, set of files,
parameter name, set of parameter
parameter value names and values
search() file, true/false
parameter name,
parameter value
The cardinality |A| of the action space is now much
larger because of combinatorial explosion in the param-
eters of an action. Assuming N files on the webserver,
and a set of M parameter names and O parameter val-
ues that can be freely combined, each action can be
instantiated N+NMO times (N times without param-
eters, and NMO times considering all combinations).
In total, we then have 3(N + NMO) concrete actions
the agent can take. A trivial agent that explicitly tracks
its state by recording, for each possible action, if it was
taken or not, would have to deal with a space with a
cardinality of 23(N+NMO)−1. Table 6 shows some esti-
mates for different values of N , M , and O.
Table 6: Number of actions and states in level3
#files #pars #pvals #actions #states
N M O 3(N +NMO) 23(N+NMO)−1
2 2 2 30 ≈ 5.4 · 108
2 5 5 156 ≈ 4.6 · 1046
5 2 2 75 ≈ 1.9 · 1022
5 5 5 390 ≈ 1.3 · 10117
10 5 5 780 ≈ 3.2 · 10234
4.2.4 Level4 - Web method layer
In level4 we scale the complexity in an effort to make
the problem more realistic. We now consider the pos-
sibility of a webserver receiving a request specifying a
web method and containing a list of parameter names
and an associated list of parameter values. This better
capture the actual dynamics of the HTTP protocol, re-
flecting the syntax of common HTTP methods such as
GET and POST. The webserver is always modeled as
a collection of files forming a directed typed graph with
nested nodes (see Figure 5).
The set of parametric actions is now restructured.
We drop the previous artificial distinction between read(),
Fig. 5: Example of webserver at level4
Solid nodes represent files, dotted nodes within a file
illustrate possible lists of parameter names and values
that may be sent to a file via a webmethod, solid ar-
rows represent connections between files given param-
eters. Inside the internal nodes the used webmethod is
indicated.
deepread(); while in previous levels of abstraction the
task of extracting explicit and implicit links was ex-
ternalized in the logic of the game, from now on it
is the task of the agent to parse and analyze the an-
swer of the webserver in order to find explicit and im-
plicit links, as well as the flag itself. The new action set
is: A = {get(filei, [pname], [pval]), post(filei, [pname,
[pval])}. The get() and post() actions implement the
respective web methods, and they receive as input a
file (filei), a list of parameter names ([pname]) together
with a list of parameter values ([pval]). The result of
these actions is a HTTP page. The flag is considered
retrieved when the agent obtains the HTTP page con-
taining the flag. See Table 7 for a summary of the ac-
tions, their parameters, and their return values.
Table 7: Actions in level4
Action name Parameters Result
get() file, HTTP page
set of parameter names,
set of parameter values
post() file, HTTP page
set of parameter names,
set of parameter values
Given, as before, N files on the webserver, M pos-
sible alternatives for the parameter names, O possible
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alternatives for the parameter values, the cardinality
|A| depends on the maximum length P of the list of
parameters. With P = 0, |A| = 2N , that is, trivially,
get() and post() actions with no parameter on each
file. With P = 1, |A| = 2N + 2NMO, that is, the same
two actions for every possible combination of zero or
one parameter name and value (similar to level3). In
the worst case in which P = M , that is the list can
be long enough to contain all the parameter names, the
number of possible actions could be estimated as:
2︸︷︷︸
actions
· N︸︷︷︸
files
·
M∑
i=0︸︷︷︸
all list
lenghts
·
(
M
i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
all combinations
of i paramnames
· Oi︸︷︷︸
all combinations
of i paramvals
A trivial agent that would store again its state knowl-
edge about actions using binary values would have to
deal with a state space of cardinality 2|A|.
4.2.5 Level5 - HTTP header layer
While all the previous layers considered only the URL
and the body part of the HTTP packets, level5 takes
the HTTP header into consideration as well. The HTTP
header can contain relevant information such as the ses-
sion variables or the web response code in the response
header. The session, which is composed by a session
variable name and value (e.g., JSESSIONID=Abvhj67 ),
is used to provide elevated access to special users; a
practical example is the login process (which may hap-
pen by sending multiple POST parameters, as mod-
eled in level4), after which the server sets a new session
value. Additional HTTP header information, such as
the browser type or the character encoding, can also
have an effect on the response provided by the web-
server.
We always model the webserver as a collection of
files forming a directed typed graph with nested ob-
jects (see Figure 6). Object access is now more com-
plex as it depends also on all the header variables.
This complexity may in part be reduced by consider-
ing a pair of session name and session value as a sin-
gle parameter (session values are usually random num-
bers with high entropy so there is no point in han-
dling the session variable name and value separately
unless the session values are predictable and the at-
tacker wants to brute-force the session value), and by
limiting the number of allowed session pairs and HTTP
headers. Under this simplification, we preserve the same
actions as level4, but we extend the signature of their in-
put parameters: A = {get(filei, [pname], [pval], [sess],
header), post(filei, [pname], [pval], [sess], header)}. Be-
side receiving an input file (filei), a list of parameter
names ([pname]) together with a list of parameter val-
Fig. 6: Example of webserver at level5
Solid nodes represent files, dotted nodes within a file
illustrate possible lists of parameter name and value
pairs and session name and value pairs that may be
sent to a file via a webmethod, solid arrows represent
respectively connections between files given parameters
and sessions.
ues ([pval]), the get() and post() methods now also re-
ceive a list of session pairs ([sess]) and a HTTP header
(header). The result of these actions is a web response,
possibly together with a HTTP page. The web response
code (e.g., 200, 404, 500) reflects the accessibility of the
requested object. As before, the flag is considered re-
trieved when the agent obtains the HTTP page contain-
ing the flag. See Table 8 for a summary of the actions,
their parameters, and their return values.
With reference to the actions we have defined, we
observe an enlargement of the action space that now
depends on the number N of files on the server, the
number M of parameter names that can selected, the
number O of parameter values available, the number P
of parameter pairs that can be sent, the number Q of
session pair values available, the number R of session
pairs that can be sent, and the number S of HTTP
header without cookies that can be sent.
Figure 6 provides also the illustration of a possible
interaction between the agent and the webserver. The
attacker first tries to log in using an invalid password,
which actually reveals a new version of the login.php
file by redirecting the page to the index.php page with-
out session. Using the right credentials shows another
version of the login.php page that instead redirects the
user to a version of index.php with the session pair ses-
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sionpair1. This version of the index.php leads then to
another version of the file (logout action) that is con-
nected to the original version of index.php without ses-
sion.
Table 8: Actions in level5
Action name Parameters Result
get() file, HTTP page,
set of parameter names, web response
set of parameter values
set of session pairs
HTTP header
post() file, HTTP page,
set of parameter names, web response
set of parameter values
set of session pairs
HTTP header
4.2.6 Level6 - Server structure layer
In a complex web hacking scenario, the attacker may
map the file system of the server in order to collect in-
formation to be used during the attack. In level6 we
extend the formalization of the webserver in order to
consider not only files within the webroot, but also ob-
jects beyond it, such as local files and databases. This
extension allows to simulate attacks relying on local file
inclusion (LFI) vulnerabilities, or information gathering
attacks on a database in order to set up a SQL injec-
tion. Figure 7 shows the structure of a webserver, and it
illustrate a possible LFI attack to obtain the webserver
logs or the environmental variables.
While the action set remains the same as level5,
the extension of the domain of the objects beyond the
webroot escalates the number of targets that the agent
may consider. Complexity soars with the increase of
objects, including databases, and, within a database,
its tables, columns and rows.
Level6 abstraction provides the agent the following
additional features compared to lower level of abstrac-
tions:
– Obtaining the local resources of the website such
as the background files if there is any or the back-
ground database records used for the website opera-
tion. The attacker can use these data for the attack
with the normal requests covered in lower layers;
– Accessing the data in order to compromise other
websites residing on the same webserver;
– Obtaining the webserver files that are used for other
purposes than the website operations, such as users
Fig. 7: Example of webserver at level6
Solid nodes represent files, dotted nodes within a file
illustrate possible lists of parameter name and value
pairs and session name and value pairs that may be sent
to a file via a webmethod, solid arrows represent con-
nections between files given parameters and sessions.
Dotted boundary lines separate different logical spaces,
such as the webserver space and the database space.
Dashed arrows mark connections between these logical
spaces.
data, other service data, operating sytem data and
use these for the attack.
In this scenario the access rights of the objects play
an important role; running a webserver as a root can
have serious consequences, while having minimum ac-
cess rights reduce the chance of such exploitations. No-
tice, though, that practically, from the point of view
of the agent, there is no difference between the cases
when an object is not present or the object is present
but there is no read access for the object by the website.
4.2.7 Level7 - Server modification layer
The last layer we consider in our Agent Web Model is
the server modification layer. In this layer we assume
that the agent can carry out complex meaningful web
hacking actions such as creating its own objects, either
inside or outside the web root. With the ability to create
its own files, the attacker can place command scripts
that can be used to carry out advanced attacks. Figure
7 show the same structure of the server as in level6,
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Fig. 8: Example of webserver at level7
Solid nodes represent files, dotted nodes within a file
illustrate possible lists of parameter name and value
pairs and session name and value pairs that may be sent
to a file via a webmethod, solid arrows represent con-
nections between files given parameters and sessions.
Dotted boundary lines separate different logical spaces,
such as the webserver space and the database space.
Dashed arrows mark connections between these logical
spaces. Boldface objects represent objects created by
the attacker.
and it illustrates an attacker creating its own files on
the webserver.
Attacking actions leading to the creation of objects
can be carried out by the web requests that we have
already considered. The action does not change, but the
domain of the parameters increases in order to allow for
more sophisticated actions.
Level7 abstraction provides the agent the following
additional features compared to lower level of abstrac-
tions:
– Causing denial of service by editing important ob-
jects for the site operation;
– Defacing the site by changing the site content;
– Escalating privileges by adding data to objects;
– Uploading attack scripts to provide extra functions
for the attack;
– Removing attack clues by deleting log files, deleting
temporary files that were used for the attack.
Level7 is assumed to be the highest level of mod-
elling, capturing all relevant features of hacking; thus,
solving this challenge is extremely hard, and we would
expect that a successful agent would perform as well
as, or better than, a professional human hacker actu-
ally involved in a process of website hacking.
5 Modelling web vulnerabilities
In this section we analyze how different types of web
vulnerabilities fit within our Agent Web Model. Refer
to Table 9 for a summary of which vulnerabilities may
be modeled at which level.
Information disclosure is a type of vulnerabil-
ity where the attacker gains useful information by pen-
etrating the system. Evaluating the usefulness of the
gained information is not trivial, but through the CTF
formalization we make the simplifying assumption that
relevant information the attacker may be interested into
is marked by the flag. In this way, it is possible to equate
successful information disclosure with the retrieval of
the flag. Every level of abstraction in our Agent Web
Model captures this attack: in level1 sensitive informa-
tion (flag) is in a public linked file on the webserver; in
level2 sensitive information (flag) can be inside a pri-
vate file; in the following layers (level3 to level5) sen-
sitive information (flag) can be accessed using special
parameters or sessions; in level 6, sensitive information
(flag) can be inside a file outside the webroot.
Web parameter tampering [16] is a type of at-
tack where the web parameters exchanged by the client
and the server are modified in order to have access to
additional objects. Our Agent Web Model captures this
attack starting at level3 by allowing the specification of
web parameters in the URL; in level4 it is possible to
add HTTP body parameters (POST message); in level5
it is possible to edit cookies in the HTTP header. In all
these instances, an agent can perform web parameter
tampering either by meaningfully exploring the space
of possible values of these parameters, or by trying to
brute-force them.
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks [13] enable
attackers to inject client-side (e.g. javascript) code into
the webpage viewed by other users. By exploiting a
XSS vulnerability the attacker can overwrite the page
content on the client side, redirect the page to the at-
tacker’s page, or steal the valid sessions inside the cookie.
All these offensive actions can be followed by some so-
cial engineering trick in case of a real attack. In the con-
text of CTF style challenges where additional clients are
not available, the aim of an attacker is simply to show
the existence of the vulnerability. A flag may be used to
denote a page that is only accessible indirectly by redi-
rection. The task for the agent is to find the right pa-
rameters to achieve the redirection. The injected client-
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side code for XSS has to be sent through web param-
eters. XSS attacks can be simulated in our Agent Web
Model as soon as we can interact with parameters: in
level3 the attacker may add code in the URL; in level4
the attacker may modify POST parameters; in level5
the XSS attack may affect the header.
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [29] is a
type of vulnerability where the attacker sends a link to
authenticated users in order to trick them to execute
web requests by social engineering. If the users are au-
thenticated (have sessions) the malicious request (e.g.,
transferring money, changing the state) is executed by
the server. This exploitation is based on social engi-
neering and on misleading the user. In addition, CSRF
tokens are sent by the server to filter out unintended
requests; the agent can check the existence of appropri-
ate CSRF tokens or exploit requests with weak CSRF
tokens. In our model the CSRF attack has to be sim-
plified to consider only the CSRF token manipulation
in layer 5.
SQL injection [1] is a vulnerability where mali-
cious SQL statements can be executed by the server
due to the lack of input validation on the server side. By
modifying the original SQL statement of a server-side
script the attackers can bypass authentication, access
confidential database information or even write attack
scripts on the server (select into outfile command). In
most of the cases the attacker has to map the database
structure of the target by finding, for instance, the dif-
ferent table names along with their column names and
types. In our Agent Web Model this attack can be com-
pletely simulated at level6, although other simplified
versions may happen at lower levels. In the easiest case
the agent only need one dynamic parameter without
sessions; bypassing only a simple authentication or col-
lecting data from the same table that the server-side
script uses does not require to know the table name
and other database structure data; in these cases, a
basic form of SQL injection may be simulated even in
level3. Complex cases comprising all the database pa-
rameters need to happen at level6. If the attacker uses
the SQL injection to carry out further actions such as
writing attacking scripts on the compromised site, then
this has to happen at level7. All the above mentioned
cases require a very high number of actions especially
when the agent has to execute a Boolean-based blind
SQL injection. In these cases, the vulnerable applica-
tion provides only true or false answers, so obtaining
one single piece of information, such as a column name
in a table, requires binary search type requests for each
character, which can lead to an exponential number of
actions. Notice that the Agent Web Model abstraction
does not consider the response time of the environment.
In very specific cases such as time-based blind SQL in-
jections, the attacker may have to measure the response
time; this type of exploitation would require the con-
sideration of the server reaction time too.
Xpath injection [4] is a web vulnerability where
the attacker injects code into the web request, but the
target of the attack is not a database (as in the case of
SQL injection) but an XML file. By exploiting Xpath
injection the attacker can iterate through XML ele-
ments and obtain the properties of the nodes one by
one. This operation requires only one parameter, so
simulating Xpath injection is theoretically possible in
level3. Since the exploitation of the Xpath injection
does not require the name of the XML file, mapping
the files outside the webroot is not necessary even if the
XML file is outside the webroot. On the other hand,
the vulnerable parameter can be a POST parameter
(level4) or it can require a specific session (level5).
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) [18] is
a vulnerability where the attacker uses native template
syntax to inject a malicious payload into a website tem-
plate. For the exploitation the agent has to use addi-
tional actions that are SSTI specific, such as sending a
string like ${7*7} together with a parameter. Theoret-
ically, an easy SSTI vulnerability can be exploited in
level3, but all other layers above can be used to rep-
resent specific attack cases (vulnerable parameter in
POST on level4, session required for exploitation on
level5); in particular cases, the attacker can list the
server structure (level6) or can create files with arbi-
trary code execution (level7).
File inclusion [17] makes the attacker capable of
including remote or local files by exploiting a vulnerable
web parameter on the website. In case of remote file
inclusion (RFI), the attacker can include its own remote
attacking script in the server-side script. Remote file
inclusion can have very serious consequences, but in a
CTF challenge the aim is just to show the possibility
of the exploitation, not to carry out an actual exploit.
RFI can be realized by providing a remote file that
sends the flag if the request is initiated from the target
website IP. Exploiting RFI is possible in level3 but other
parameters, such as POST request and sessions, can be
relevant (level4 and level5). As a consequence of the
RFI vulnerability the attacker can create files on the
website for further attacks. In case of local file inclusion
(LFI), the attacker can include local files in the server-
side script. For the exploitation one single parameter is
theoretically enough, but since usually it is necessary
to read local files outside the webroot, the agent has to
map at least a part of the server structure (level6). In
some exploitation scenarios the attacker can use local
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files (such as logs or files in the /proc linux folder) to
create its own files on the server (level7).
Session-related attacks [36] exploit session dis-
closure or other weaknesses in the session generation
process. Since we model the environment as the server
itself without other network nodes, man in the middle
session disclosures cannot be considered. Other session
disclosures can be possible, for instance, if the sessions
are stored in the logs and the website can access the
log files (LFI), as modeled on level6. Brute-forcing the
session is also possible in level5, but brute-force actions
increase dramatically the complexity and the number
of possible actions.
HTTP response splitting [15] is a vulnerability
where the attacker can control the content of the HTTP
header of a web request. The ability of the attacker to
construct arbitrary HTTP responses can result in many
other exploits such as cache poisoning or Cross Site
Scripting. Our Agent Web Model considers the HTTP
header information in level5, but only with limited in-
formation (different session pairs and the whole header
together with different versions). Training the agent to
learn HTTP response splitting exploitation would re-
quire to split the HTTP header in multiple parts and
allow the agent to consider actions on different HTTP
header combinations.
Table 9: Web vulnerabilities in the Agent Web Model
Agent
Web Web Comment
Vulnerability Model
Layers
Information 1-6 Flag in web files,
disclosure header or outside object
Parameter 3-5 Flag access with modified
tampering parameters or sessions
Cross Site 3-5 Flag access with
Scripting client-side redirection
Cross Site 5 Only CSRF token
Request Forgery manipulation
SQL injection 3-7 Flag with authentication
bypass or from database
Xpath injection 3-4 Flag with authentication
bypass or from XML file
Server-Side 3-7 Flag with object access
Template Injection or privilege escalation
Remote File 3 Flag with remote
Inclusion file access
Local File 3-7 Flag with local
Inclusion file access
Session related 5-6 Flag with session
attacks manipulation
HTTP response 5 Flag with HTTP header
splitting manipulation
6 Implementation of the Agent Web Model
An implementation of the first three levels of the Agent
Web Model has been developed in agreement with the
standard defined in the OpenAI gym framework [6], and
it has been made available online1. Each level provides
a simple interface to an abstraction of a CTF challenge;
a webserver makes available to the agent a finite set of
actions, and it returns information about the state of
the game upon the choice of an action. Levels may be in-
stantiated parametrically (deciding the number of files,
the links, and the possible parameters), thus offering
the possibility of generating a wide variety of challenges
for a learning agent. The first three levels already offer
a wide degree of challenge: while level1 provides a sim-
ple, tutorial-like, CTF game, the third level constitute
a non-trivial abstraction of a real hacking challenge.
By adopting the standardized OpenAI gym inter-
face, we hope to make it easy for researchers and prac-
titioners to test their agents and algorithms on our chal-
lenges. In particular, we hope to simplify the process of
deploying and training off-the-shelf RL agent, as well
as provide interesting problems that may promote the
development of new learning algorithms.
7 Ethical considerations
RL agents trained for ethical penetration testing carry
with them the potential for malicious misuse. In par-
ticular, the same agents may be deployed and adapted
with the aim of generating material or immaterial dam-
age. We would like to repeat that the aim of the current
study is to develop agents to assist ethical hackers in
legitimate penetration testing, and to develop an un-
derstanding of RL agents on a preventive ground only.
For this reason, we advocate the development of agents
in the context of CTF challenges, where the aim is a
minimal and harmless exploitation of a vulnerability as
a proof-of-concept (capture of the flag), but no further
attacks are considered. We distance ourselves and con-
demn any application of these results for the develop-
ment of offensive tools, especially in a military context2.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a model, named Agent Web
Model, that defines web hacking at different levels of ab-
straction. This formulation allows for a straightforward
1 https://github.com/FMZennaro/gym-agentwebmodel
2 https://futureoflife.org/
open-letter-autonomous-weapons/
The Agent Web Model 15
implementation of problems suited for machine learn-
ing agents. Since the aim and type of web attacks can
be various, and different technical and human methods
may be involved, we first restricted our attention to
CTF-style hacking problems. We then modeled CTF-
style web hacking as a game and as a RL problem.
The RL problem considers a single player dealing with
a static website consisting of objects with which the
agent can interact by sending requests (with or with-
out parameters). We formalized RL problems on 7 dif-
ferent levels of abstraction, ordered by increasing com-
plexity in terms of number of objects, actions, param-
eters and states. Starting from a simple challenge on
the first level of abstraction, we observed the complex-
ity of the problems quickly increasing, thus defining a
non-trivial learning challenge for an artificial agent. An
implementation of the problems on the first levels of ab-
straction was provided. The challenges we implemented
range in complexity, they allow for customizability, and
provide a way to instantiate a large number of random
web hacking challenges in a generative way in order to
train an artificial agent. Future work will be directed
to further developing and further standardizing CTF
challenges at higher levels of abstraction, as well as ap-
plying state of the art RL techniques to the problems
we defined.
It is our hope that the formalization presented in
this paper may not only allow for the development of
automatic red bots that may help in the task of ethical
penetration testing, but also promote the interaction
and the research in both fields of machine learning and
computer security: helping security expert to define re-
alistic and relevant challenges that meet the formalism
of machine learning, and offering to the RL expert stim-
ulating problems that may foster advances in machine
learning.
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